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Tipping points among social learners: Tools from varied  
disciplines 
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Abstract  There is a long and rich tradition in the social sciences of using models of collective behavior in animals as jump-
ing-off points for the study of human behavior, including collective human behavior. Here, we come at the problem in a slightly 
different fashion. We ask whether models of collective human behavior have anything to offer those who study animal behavior. 
Our brief example of tipping points, a model first developed in the physical sciences and later used in the social sciences, suggests 
that the analysis of human collective behavior does indeed have considerable to offer [Current Zoology 58 (2): 298306, 2012]. 
Keywords  Networks, Social learning, Thresholds, Time series, Tipping points 
Animal behavior is one arena where social learning, 
defined as learning by observing or interacting with 
others (Heyes, 1994) as opposed to learning individually, 
is studied in its most uncomplicated form (e.g., Laland, 
2004; Couzin et al., 2005). Nevertheless, groups of 
animals in which individuals learn from and respond to 
other individuals are still complex systems. For example, 
in flocks of birds or schools of fish, it takes only a small 
fraction of individual learners to impart a coherent di-
rection to the entire group, as the majority copies the 
travel direction of neighbors (Couzin et al., 2005). 
Flocks gain their coherent directionality through avera-
ging the individual perceptions of each bird.  
By studying the collective behavior of animals, the 
dynamics of these systems can be observed and ma-
nipulated clearly enough to often lend insight into the 
core of much more complex dynamics of human socie-
ties and groups (Laland and Reader, 2010). The relative 
simplicity of rules by which animals interact can help us 
see through the fog of complicated factors that pervade 
human social behavior. What about the reverse? Can 
studies of collective human behavior tell us anything 
important about animal behavior? 
As an example we focus on a single issue, tipping 
points in human (and mechanical) systems. Although its 
origin lies in the sociology of the 1950s, the term “tip-
ping point” has risen dramatically in popularity only in 
the last decade, catalyzed by Gladwell’s (2000) best-
selling book, and now regularly used in studies of such 
topics as climate change (Russill and Nyssa, 2009) and 
finance (Scheffer et al., 2009). 
1  Scaling Up 
Although care needs to be taken in scaling up obser-
vations on flocks of birds or schools of fish to human 
groups, they provide potentially profound hypotheses 
about collective decisions in human groups, in that the 
most persuasive or influential property may not neces-
sarily be logical superiority in skill or status—increased 
working memory, ability to delay gratification, and the 
like—but rather the persistence of the message, a strate-
gy of which opinion leaders and marketers make ex-
plicit use. This effect may arise from the network rather 
than from a special individual. Highly clustered social 
networks, for example, appear to favor the spread both 
of norms of cooperation (Ohtsuki et al., 2006) and of 
innovations by introducing them repeatedly to individu-
als through different neighbors of a cluster (Helbing and 
Yu, 2009; Centola, 2010; Lorenz et al., 2011). 
Studies of collective animal behavior can also tell us 
something about the so-called “wisdom of crowds” 
(Suroweicki, 2004). A group of animals migrates long 
distances through lots of “noisy” directional cues that 
are smoothed out and integrated across the group, 
through social learning among individuals. Similarly, 
experiments in psychology have shown that a group of 
people with average intelligence can brainstorm better 
and plan their activities more effectively than “smarter” 
individuals (Wooley et al., 2010). 
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relative to the averaged behavior of large groups, they 
also highlight the presence of abrupt changes. For flocks 
of birds, for example, false alarms can spread and am-
plify across a flock through bad information (Couzin et 
al., 2005). Hence, in both human and animal groups, the 
element of individual thinking and accurate information 
is critical (Bentley and O’Brien, 2011). Even simple 
forms of animal social learning give a group higher- 
order computational capacities to respond to its envi-
ronment (Couzin, 2007). 
2  Scaling Down  
Given the leap in cognitive ability that humans pos-
sess, are human models applicable to the study of ani-
mals? Multiple animal species are able to learn (Laland 
and Reader, 2010), but only groups of humans—more 
accurate and complex social imitators than any other 
animals—can substantially accumulate socially learned 
information over generations. Humans continue to 
“learn things from others, improve those things, trans-
mit them to the next generation, where they are im-
proved again, and so on,” and this process continues to 
lead to the “rapid cultural evolution of superbly de-
signed adaptations to particular environments” (Boyd 
and Richerson, 2005: 4, emphasis in original). Human 
cultural transmission is thus characterized by the 
so-called “ratchet effect,” in which modifications and 
improvements stay in the population until further 
changes ratchet things up again (Tomasello et al., 1993; 
Tennie et al., 2009).  
The question is, if collective human behavior is so 
complex that it far outstrips the processes and compo-
nents that scaffold animal behavior, perhaps the applica-
tion of the former to the later is analytically naive. We 
reject this proposition on two grounds. First, a vast 
amount of research has shown that the collective be-
havior of many animals—birds, ants, locusts, Morman 
beetles, and hundreds of other taxa (e.g., Couzin et al., 
2005; Buhl et al., 2006; Bode et al., 2010; Eriksson et 
al., 2010; Katz et al., 2011)—are as varied and as com-
plicated as any collective behaviors exhibited by hu-
mans. Second, and perhaps counterintuitively, many 
models of collective human behavior—stock-market 
activity, for example—make undemanding assumptions 
about human intelligence and in fact have been termed 
“zero-intelligence” models (Farmer et al., 2005). Al-
though zero-intelligence models in finance are con-
cerned with how traders arrive at prices for equities, the 
central mechanism is the same as the new breed of 
models of flocking and herding: agents copy the actions 
of other agents with a certain degree of error. This com-
bination of transmission and error should sound familiar, 
as it reflects two of the three elements of the evolution-
nary process, inheritance and variation. This is why 
these simple models are so powerful. 
It appears that sociological models may have in-
formed zoological models in terms of how a consensus 
or preference forms. Palfrey and Poole (1987), for ex-
ample, modeled “voters” as varying in how well in-
formed they were about political candidates. Starting 
with a bimodal distribution of voter preference, they 
found that adding uninformed agents increased the ten-
dency for the consensus to regress to a single mode. 
Uninformed individuals effectively diluted the influence 
of those who were better informed. Similarly, Couzin 
and colleagues (2011) considered the role of neutrality, 
or ignorance, among group members in achieving group 
consensus. As they show, it is possible for group con-
sensus to be controlled by a small but determined mi-
nority that has much stronger preferences than the ma-
jority. In addition, the transition from the majority-rules 
state to the minority-rules state occurs in tipping-point 
fashion. A rapid transition occurs between dynamic 
phases as the strength of preferences in the informed 
minority is increased and/or the fraction of uninformed 
members of the population is increased (to a point).  
Using as an analogy flocks or schools, each agent is 
assigned a direction vector, and the strength of its prefe-
rence (directionality) is captured by the magnitude of 
that vector. The only other rules are that each agent 
aligns with the direction of travel of its neighbors and 
avoids collisions. Couzin and colleagues supposed there 
are two subpopulations—a majority traveling by fol-
lowing direction vector w1 and a minority following 
direction vector w2. The group normally follows the 
majority direction except as w2 is made greater than w1, 
whereupon the group suddenly directs itself in the mi-
nority direction (Fig. 1a). These results were nicely con-
firmed by controlled experiments with fish (golden 
shiners Notemigonus crysoleucas) trained to prefer a 
blue or a yellow target destination and then released in 
different proportions from the tank side opposite those 
target destinations (Couzin et al., 2011). 
A second version of Couzin and colleagues’ model is 
a binary-choice model that is effectively equivalent to 
the socio-ecological models of Watts (2002) and 
Haldane and May (2010), which we will describe in the 
next section. Couzin and colleagues set agents within a 
fixed network and allowed them to adopt, probabilisti-
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Fig. 1  Tipping points in the collective behavior model of Couzin et al. (2011) 
As the directional preference of the minority (w2) is made greater than the preference of the majority (w1), the group suddenly directs itself in the 
minority direction (left-handed). As the density of uninformed individuals is increased, the consensus abruptly shifts from minority to majority 
(right-handed). 
 
their local network. Each agent also had its own level of 
“intransigence” during interactions, equivalent to the 
social-conformity thresholds explored by Watts (2002). 
The result was again a sharp tipping point from mino-
rity- to majority-controlled outcome. As Fig. 1b shows, 
as the density of uninformed individuals is increased, 
the consensus abruptly shifts from minority to majority, 
as uninformed individuals inhibit the influence from the 
strongly opinionated minority (Couzin et al. 2011). This 
resembles tipping points studied in social sciences. 
3  Tipping Points 
Prior to the study of Couzin and colleagues, tipping 
points in group dynamics have also been observed and 
modeled in the behaviors and interactions of social in-
sects, for example (Beekman et al. 2001; Theraulaz et al. 
2002; Amé et al. 2006). Perhaps because language af-
fects how science is practiced (Griffiths and Steyvers, 
2004; Evans and Foster, 2011), there is a resurgence in 
the academic study of tipping points, especially as they 
relate to the social sciences. The value of this body of 
research for animal scientists lies in the complex-  
systems approach—a value that is increasingly being 
realized through studies that treat human systems and 
ecological systems interchangeably (e.g., Dyer et al., 
2009; Saavedra et al., 2009; Haldane and May, 2011). 
Generally speaking, the fundamental question is how, 
through a change in one system parameter, an abrupt 
change occurs in another measure that describes the 
state of the system. Parameters and changes can take 
many forms, and in some cases it is easy to see the po-
tential link to collective animal systems. Schelling 
(1971), for example, ostensibly was concerned with 
ethnic segregation, but the crucial parameter in his 
model was the threshold that modeled agents had for 
different neighbors, the critical value of which segre-
gated the modeled population.  
Another classic tipping-point parameter is the aver-
age number of network connections per agent at which a 
random network becomes a giant interconnected cluster 
(Erdős and Rényi, 1960). Similarly, a tipping point 
might describe a bifurcation in the behavior of an itera-
ted equation (Brock and Hommes, 1997), such as the 
classic logistic map xt+1 = Axt(1-xt), which, as A is in-
creased from 3.0 to 4.0, becomes chaotic, such that each 
result is never repeated in subsequent iterations.  
Although highly instructive, rarely are the parameters 
of these models measurable or realistic enough for tip-
ping points to be predicted in the world of interacting 
animals. Typically what are measured are the characteri-
stics of a time series of a single system variable (e.g., 
Scheffer et al., 2009) or the coordination of nontemporal 
factors such as the interconnectedness of the system and 
the propensity for each of its individual agents to move 
or change (e.g., Haldane and May, 2011). Given the 
cost-benefit limits on predictability (Goldstein and Se-
heult, 2008), such measurable characteristics can be 
subject to certain simple tools for evaluating tipping 
points, through tests of quantitative time-series data and 
qualitative interaction. These are termed “threshold as-
sessments.”  
4  Time Series: Simple Tricks 
The record of the past is our best view into the future, 
and in the science of behavior we are often presented 
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species to climatic events or the incidence of certain 
animal behavior observed in the lab or the field (e.g., 
Ormerod, 1998, 2006; Michie, 2006; Long, 2009; Willis 
et al., 2009). Often faced with measurements of one 
state variable—algae population, stock price, observed 
incidences of an animal behavior—plotted over time, 
researchers are often motivated to squeeze as much out 
of these time series as possible. Recently, Scheffer et al. 
(2009) reviewed the tools applicable to time-series data 
in identifying signals that might predate a tipping point. 
In their review, tipping point refers to the point in time 
when a system (a) jumps abruptly to a new steady state, 
(b) bifurcates into a pattern of oscillation between attra-
ctor states, or (c) transitions into chaotic behavior 
(Scheffer et al. 2009; see also Lamberson and Page, 
2012). For any given time series of events, the critical 
tools that Scheffer et al. (2009) identify include 
1. A critical slowing down, where the response time 
to an external perturbation takes longer and longer to 
return to the steady state, the tipping point being when it 
ultimately never returns;   
2. An increasing range and significance of the auto-
correlation within the time series, the simplest form of 
which is the degree to which the state at time t-1 predicts 
the state at time t; 
3. A skewness in the response, such that the magni-
tude and response time in one direction (increase or 
decrease in the parameter describing the system) is 
much longer than those in the other direction. This sig-
nals that the basin of attraction is asymmetrical and that 
the system may soon “roll off” in the direction away 
from the current attractor; and 
4. A flickering between discrete values of the system 
parameter, signaling that the system may already have 
reached bifurcation.  
In principle, these criteria can be applied to time se-
ries representing a large range of systems of interacting 
elements.  
Before considering animal systems, it might be help-
ful to first consider how these tools were used for ana-
lyzing other systems. Dakos and colleagues (2008), for 
example, showed how a critical slowing down in time 
series of climate-proxy data preceded eight different 
abrupt climate changes in the Earth’s history. In ecology, 
a time series of population size was shown to fore-
shadow a critical transition in extinction equilibrium 
through pronounced autocorrelation, increased skew-
ness, and a critical slowing down (Drake and Griffen, 
2010). The human system most often compared meta-
phorically to an animal herd is the stock market. Aside 
from the rough analogy, tools used for financial data 
have successfully been applied to animal-behavior data. 
One example concerned the data on animal group size 
collected by Hill and Dunbar (2003), which struck the 
interest of researchers who analyze financial time series 
in detail. The study (Zhou et al., 2005) revealed the hi-
erarchical nature of animal social groups in that the 
group-size data showed a modularity such that each new 
order of group size was three times larger than the pre-
vious one. Those animals happened to be humans, and 
the data concerned their networks of holiday cards sent 
to each other (Hill and Dunbar, 2003), but the insight 
about the hidden hierarchical organization then led, by 
way of a similar discovery about hunter–gatherers 
(Hamilton et al., 2007), to essentially the same realiza-
tion about hierarchical groupings of baboons, orcas, and 
elephants (Hill et al., 2008). In other words, the social 
study of humans, combined with insights from a geo-
physicist and an expert on financial time series, pro-
duced new insights into animal behavior.  
5  System Interconnections and  
Thresholds 
Ideally, time-series analysis would be complemented 
by a quantitative, or even a qualitative, assessment of 
the configuration of the different parts and their interac-
tions. Network science is an increasingly popular ap-
proach, but for many dynamical systems the actual in-
terconnections, especially brief encounters between 
animals, are ephemeral or so numerous as to be un-
countable. In comparison, an ecosystem model may 
offer significant new insights into the dynamics, par-
ticularly where uncertainty is high. For example, after 
demonstrating that climate change would disrupt entire 
networks of bird populations across Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Hole and colleagues (2009) advocated increasing the 
number and size of protected areas, restoring critical 
habitat types, and active monitoring. These recommen-
dations resemble those offered for business in an uncer-
tain environment, which include increasing the number 
of bets made in the market and continual monitoring 
and feedback (Watts and Hasker, 2006). 
Bringing insights from ecology into finance, Haldane 
and May (2011) used a well-researched ecosystem 
model that assumes there exists a population of discrete, 
interacting agents—species, people, perhaps social ani-
mals—and the individual elements of the system are 
characterized by some threshold to movement. Haldane 
and May just happened to be interested in banks rather 
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“ecosystem” featured banks as the species, interbank 
loans as their interconnections, and cash reserves as the 
threshold to a bank’s extinction. This system was prone 
to mass extinctions. If a bank’s cash reserves fell below 
zero, then it failed, which meant that any banks de-
pendent on it for interbank loans were suddenly cut off, 
such that they might fail, and so on. Clearly, the closer 
to the bone that the banks operated, with just a sliver of 
cash assets above their liabilities, the higher the risk of 
failure and the more prone the modeled system was to 
catastrophic failure.  
The general lesson here is to consider systems in 
terms of interconnections and thresholds to change 
rather than in terms of the details of individual agents. 
In other words, interconnections and thresholds are what 
should be studied more intensively in terms of the dis-
tribution of each measure per agent. Do all agents have 
the same number of connections and the same threshold 
to change, or are they distributed normally or in a non- 
Gaussian manner? Do the distributions change over 
time? These kinds of information are labor-intensive to 
collect in the field, in terms of observing animal interac-
tions, but the recognition of the kinds of data needed 
could lead to a radical change in collection strategies.  
Haldane and May’s (2011) model also reveals, less 
intuitively, that the degree of interconnection between 
agents also affects the resilience of a system. This can 
be seen in a plot of the space of possibilities, with the 
average threshold on the x-axis and the average number 
of interconnections per agent (assumed to be normally 
distributed) on the y-axis. In Fig. 2a, the shaded area 
indicates the space in which the banking system of 
Haldane and May is prone to system-sweeping ava-
lanches of change. One can see that lowering the 
threshold brings the system into this region, where there 
is a middle range of interconnectivity (the point at 
which the shaded region is fattest). 
In the abstract, this space of potential cascades, 
which is dependent on interconnections versus indivi-
dual thresholds to change, is the same as that yielded by 
a model of information cascades across a network of 
social agents. Watts (2002) modeled social agents as 
being capable of a binary decision—adopt or not adopt 
a behavior. We know that different behaviors diffuse 
through chimpanzee groups, for example (Whiten and 
Mesoudi, 2008), so this kind of analysis may be appli-
cable to the recognition of chimpanzee “cultures” across 
geographic regions (Whiten et al., 1999).  
Watts’s (2002) model was based on a classic experi-
ment in social conformity (Asch, 1955), where each 
agent in the network had a threshold of the fraction of 
neighboring agents (in a random network with mean of 
k connections per agent) that had to adopt an idea before 
he would adopt it. Each time an agent switched, this 
changed the friends’ circle for its surrounding agents 
and might cause one of them to switch, and so on, per-
colating through the “vulnerable cluster” of agents 
(Watts, 2002). In running the model over the range of 
parameter values, Watts produced a map of cascade po-
tential (Fig. 2b) that was quite similar to the model of 
bank-failure cascades presented by Haldane and May 
(2011). 
These ecosystem models, and their generality, are 
closely related to a family of models from the 1990s that 
considered evolution as being analogous to highly in-
terconnected physical systems (sand piles and forest  
 
 
Fig. 2  The model of Haldane and May (2011), showing the combination of factors (average net worth of banks versus in-
terconnections per bank) where the “ecosystem” of banks is susceptible to a sweeping cascade of failure (left-handed). The 
model of Watts (2002), showing the same region of susceptibility of cascades, but in this case the tipping point leads to an 
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fires were common models), where small changes could, 
once in a while, trigger massive avalanches of change. 
Both could be described, in the words of the day, as 
“self-organized critical” systems (Bak et al., 1987), 
precariously balanced between the building up of inter-
dependencies. As with the addition of a grain of sand to 
the sand pile, the extinction of a single species could 
cause the extinction of other species that were ecologi-
cally dependent on it (Sneppen et al., 1995; Paczuski et 
al., 1996; Solé and Manubria, 1996).  
As often happens in science, one aspect of the thin-
king gets selected and others get left behind. We think it 
is worthwhile to revisit the thinking of Stuart Kauffman 
(1993, 1995), who in his now-classic modeling of a 
system of interacting agents revitalized Sewall Wright’s 
1930s concept of the fitness landscape undergoing con-
stant change, which Kauffman called “dynamic” fitness 
landscapes. Kauffman showed that if agents are con-
nected only moderately, then by adjusting their strate-
gies accordingly, agents can all adapt fairly easily. 
However, as things become more interconnected, agents 
must choose either to make small adjustments to opti-
mize their current strategy or undertake major, risky 
changes in order to seek a better long-term strategy. 
When the network is completely interconnected, highly 
favorable strategies may be impossible to locate. This 
“hill-climbing” approach has now been effective in un-
derstanding how animals as cognitively limited as 
sticklebacks adapt collectively (e.g., Kendal et al., 
2009).  
6  Distributions 
One signature of Kauffman’s model was a highly 
right-skewed distribution in the range of possible chain 
reactions, from the majority of very small changes to the 
minority of catastrophically large avalanches. In the 
1990s, distributions were at the center of a debate about 
the evolutionary process that creates distributions of 
cascade sizes and durations (e.g., Sneppen et al., 1995; 
Newman, 1996, 1997; Paczuski et al., 1996; Solé and 
Manubria, 1996; Kirchner and Weil, 1998; Newman and 
Eble, 1999a, 1999b). Different explanations for the dis-
tributions provide multiple testable hypotheses that can 
be compared against real data, such as the distribution 
of branch lengths of a phylogenetic tree (Burlando, 
1990; Bak and Boettcher, 1997). By comparing a range 
of different distributions (exponential, Weibull, 
log-normal, almost power law), Venditti et al. (2010) 
discovered that the branch lengths of fossil evolutionary 
trees are often distributed by an exponential function.  
The new complexity science highlighted the question 
of whether events in a time series (such as a fossil re-
cord) were caused independently, by extreme external 
events, or possibly through the vast tangle of intercon-
nections, such that a small event could trigger a cascade. 
Making Kauffman’s model even more simple, Sneppen 
et al. (1995) modeled their “ecosystem” as the arrange-
ment of index numbers (“species”) in a circle, such that  
 
 
Fig. 3  In the Sneppen et al. (1995) model (after Paczuski et al., 1996), as shown at left, agents are arranged in a circle and 
assigned fitness (“barrier”) values between 0 and 1. Then, at each time step in the simulation, the smallest fitness, together 
with the fitness of the two neighbors, are each replaced with new random fitness values. This step is repeated again and 
again. On the right is a “snapshot” of agent fitness during the critical state. The x-axis shows the agents’ positions on the 
circle, and the y-axis shows their fitness at a single time step. Note that almost all agents have fitness values above a 
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each agent interacts with its two nearest neighbors (Fig. 
3). Each agent is represented by a fitness value between 
0 and 1, chosen at random to start the simulation. At 
each time step of the simulation, the lowest fitness value 
in the circle is selected against and assigned a new ran-
dom value. The two nearest neighbors of the chosen 
agent are also randomly assigned new fitness values, as 
the “adaptation” of dependent agents.  
The dynamics of this simple model, however, are 
surprisingly rich and complicated (e.g., Paczuski et al., 
1996). In essence, the model holds the essential ele-
ments of inheritance and variation we have described so 
far: through selection against the worst fitness in each 
time step, the fitnesses of all the remaining agents rise 
over time, but then the “ecosystem” inevitably reaches a 
tipping point. All the species are fit, meaning that the 
next ones taken out are replaced by random values, such 
that one of these new agents is likely chosen again, and 
so on, as a localized avalanche forms, with a growing 
cluster of random fitnesses within a larger world of fit-
nesses above the critical value. Just as in the Haldane 
and May (2011) model, avalanches can be made more 
likely by making agents more densely interconnected 
(Sneppen et al., 1995; Paczuski et al., 1996). 
All these models have the common element of 
thresholds and interconnections. Later, Newman (1997) 
presented a simple model with no interconnections, 
from which he was able to produce similar power-law 
distributions, and Newman (2005) has since showed 
convincingly that multiple processes can generate these 
distributions. This work was highly productive and 
needs to be investigated by those currently working on 
tipping points so that we do not end up reinventing the 
wheel. For example, recent studies of social networks 
often present bidirectional links between agents of only 
one kind, and yet 15 years ago, when Solé and Manu-
bria (1996) varied the Sneppen et al. (1995) model by 
assigning variable strengths and signs to agent inter-
connections (they can be beneficial or harmful relation-
ships), they produced rich new dynamics. These need to 
be revisited by tipping-point enthusiasts. 
In sum, when we look back at the last 20 years of 
modeling tipping points in collective behavior, we see 
that many of these models focus on the intricacies of the 
agents within the group only in terms of (a) what the 
thresholds are to movement or change and (b) how they 
are interconnected with each other. Among the measu-
rable emergent phenomena from these systems, two of 
the most highly studied in human systems have been 
time series of the frequency in a certain behavior and 
distributions of frequency among all the different possi-
ble behavior within any given time period.  
7  Applications to Current Zoology 
Analytical emphasis on models of human collective 
behavior could justify substantial changes in how in-
formation is collected in zoological fieldwork, particu-
larly for social animals. A behavior can thus be observed 
among individuals but also depicted among a network 
of individuals. In animal social-diffusion experiments 
(e.g., Whiten and Mesoudi, 2008), is the assumption that 
the behavior can be copied between any two individuals, 
or is there a network involved? And if the network is not 
practicably observable, can the emergent patterns such 
as the distributions of cascade sizes perhaps be used to 
infer how events were interconnected (Venditti et al., 
2010)? Can certain groups be characterized as nearer to 
a tipping point based on observations of network density, 
time series of behavioral events, distribution of fre-
quency of behaviors, or a sustained increase in the vari-
ance of a behavior (Carpenter and Brock, 2006)? These 
questions could be explored through new ways of col-
lecting and thinking about data on social animal beha-
vior. 
We therefore suggest three tools might be brought to 
bear: 1. Simple time series analysis as advocated by 
Scheffer et al. (2009); 2. Study of distributions resur-
rected by Venditti et al. (2010); and 3. Explicit consid-
eration of interconnections and thresholds: may require 
different field information-collection strategies. 
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